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HOW LACAN’S ETHICS MIGHT IMPROVE OUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE 
OF PLATONISM: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILSM OF A 
‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.
Tim Themi
AbstrAct: This paper sets to answering the question of how Lacan’s 1959-60 Seminar on The 
Ethics of  Psychoanalysis1, with its recurring critique of the Platonic idea of a moral Sovereign Good, 
might contribute to and improve our understanding of the Nietzschean project to diagnose 
the moral metaphysics instigated by Plato in philosophy, and by Christianity in religion, as a 
history of untruth and nihilism––opposed to life––in preparation for its overcoming. I explore the 
possibility that Lacan’s Ethics might make such a contribution by i) its tripartite ontology of the 
real, the symbolic and the imaginary serving as an additional frame of reference for examining 
the nature of the Good and our configurations of desire beneath it; and ii) by its more detailed 
elaboration of the archaic, polymorphous perversity at the instinctual base of the drives, what 
Lacan in his Ethics will call das Ding, the somewhat diabolical Freudian Thing. I also attempt to 
indicate how Nietzsche’s own ethics might make a contribution to those of the Lacanian, for the 
purposes of further combating what I will take to be the contemporary neurosis and nihilism of 
a ‘life’ against life––as indicated today for instance by such phenomena as the physical destruction 
of the environment, along with us as amongst its earthly inhabitants. 
Keywords: Lacan; Nietzsche; Ethics; Platonism; Aristotle; the Good; Nihilism; the Death-drive; 
the Real, Life.
INTRODUCTION: LACAN & NIETZSCHE.
In 2006 a Lacanian analyst and professor of philosophy at Buenos Aires contributes 
a small paper to a collection put together by Slavoj Žižek entitled: Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan2. 
A paper in which said analyst-professor Silvia Ons, makes for the reasoned claim that the 
Lacan-Nietzsche relation remains still at present under-examined: something she finds 
both “surprising and symptomatic”.3 Surprising because Nietzsche is the philosopher 
     1. Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, 1959-60: The Seminar of  Jacques Lacan Book VII, ed. J-A Miller, 
trans. D. Porter, Norton: NY-London, 1991 (will also be referred to as Lacan’s Ethics, and cited in text with 
page number as LE).
     2. Sylvia Ons, ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan’, in Slavoj Žižek ed., Lacan: The Silent Partners, Verso: London-NY, 
2006, pp. 79-90. 
     3. Ons, ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan’, in Žižek ed., Lacan: The Silent Partners, p. 80.
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who would be closest to psychoanalysis: a precursor of whom Freud at one point concedes 
anticipates psychoanalysis in “the many instances”4. Nietzsche is the philosopher who 
as Ons puts it once discovers “the symptom in morality”5: or as I will put it here for 
further examination, discovers a certain moral idea of the Good to be symptomatic of a 
‘life’ lived in too many ways opposed to life; an idea to be promoted as cure for precisely 
the problems it is many times source of.    
Lacan’s Seminar The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, with its recurring critique of precisely 
this idea of the moral Good, contains what I take then to be Lacan’s most direct connec-
tion with Nietzsche’s main project of exposing the metaphysics underlying the history of 
Western morality as a Platonism which leads to neurosis and nihilism. Such metaphysics 
for both Nietzsche and Lacan might only mean now that some error, fiction, illusion or 
phantasy of the Good in the imaginary has been mistaken as ‘truth’, as ‘real’, when it is 
really only the symptom of the abeyance of a particular aspect of the truth, or modicum 
of the real. As a process which is diagnosable as neurosis or a nihilism, what can and 
will be argued here is its doing us more harm than ‘good’ in the end after bearing its load 
nigh for two-thousand years or more: ever since Plato in particular introduced its spe-
cies into the cradle of the West––whereupon we might find that it continues to protract 
itself derivative forms, right up to this day.
Contextually, the conjunction I am detecting here between Lacan and Nietzsche in 
their mutual antipathy towards the moral metaphysics of Platonism is no accident––and 
not only because Nietzsche anticipates much in Freud and Lacan is a kind of Freud-
ian: but also because Lacan in his early twenties reportedly gives Nietzsche an “avid 
reading” whence breaking away from “his mother’s Catholicism”6. What’s more, Lacan 
takes to Nietzsche around about the same time as his close to become acquaintance 
in Bataille was also attempting something similar: the very Bataille who later not only 
exerts at least an undercurrent of influence on Lacan, but also helps introduce Nietzsche 
into a position of prominence in the very intellectual setting that Lacan was to become 
something of a doyen in.7 Nietzsche was emerging as a key theoretical figure in Lacan’s 
post-war Paris, soon to be the driving force behind such luminaries as Foucault, De-
leuze and Derrida after Heidegger had earlier helped drive him out across the Rhine8; 
whilst Walter Kaufman was also busily erecting Nietzsche as the monument forever to 
     4. Cf., Sigmund Freud, ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’, in The Standard Edition of  the 
Complete Psychological Works of  Sigmund Freud, Vol XIV, ed. & trans. J. Strachey, Vintage: London, 2001, pp. 
15-16 (Henceforth for instance as SE14:15). A study of the Freud-Nietzsche relation can be found attempted 
in Paul-Laurent Assoun, Freud and Nietzsche, Continuum: London-NY, 2000. 
     5. Ons, ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan’, in Žižek ed., Lacan: The Silent Partners, p. 80.
     6. William J. Richardson, ‘Jacques Lacan: Elizabeth Roudinesco’, J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 48: 645. 
     7. A chapter on the shared circles of Lacan and Bataille can be found in Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques 
Lacan, trans. B. Bray, Columbia University Press: NY, 1994, pp. 121-40, and also in Fred Botting & Scott 
Wilson, Bataille, Palgrave: NY, 2001, pp. 79-92. For more on the thematic connections between Lacan’s 
Ethics and Bataille’s own project, see also Benjamin Noys, ‘Shattering the Subject: Georges Bataille & the 
Limits of Therapy’, European Journal of  Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health, Sep 2005; 7 (3): 125-136, p. 132. 
     8. A study on the indebtedness to Nietzsche of postwar French thought can be found in Alan D. Schrift, 
Nietzsche’s French Legacy: A Genealogy of  Post-Structuralism, Routledge: NY, 1995. 
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behold, out further across to the West.9
What I take to be at stake in my own paper can be expressed thus: Whereas the 
Nietzschean project can seem most prodigious in its affirmation of life, even though it 
has ostensibly dispensed with the ‘comforting’ illusions that the history of Platonic meta-
physics has given; the project of psychoanalysis on the other hand can seem positive less 
so, but also appears to have gone further in the process of illusion rending with its more 
detailed disclosure of the Freudian Thing at the base of our drives. Thus given such 
findings of psychoanalysis, can we still make an affirmation of life as such within the 
counter-nihilist ethic of the full Nietzschean spirit? Or would we rather, with this Thing 
within which we deny and despise coming back at us in the real, in the form of mount-
ing evidence of an ecological catastrophe approaching, be happily resigned instead to 
this deathly end as a welcome respite. Like the Oedipus Lacan presents at the end of his 
Ethics: as the man of knowledge who feels by now, only that he has known too much––and 
whose “last word is, as you know”, Lacan tells us, “that phrase μή φύναι”10… as if not 
to be born were exceedingly best!
1. INTERPRETATION OF LACAN’S TRIPARTITE ONTOLOGY AS FRAM-
ING THE ANALYSIS OF PLATONISM: THE REAL, SYMBOLIC & IMAGI-
NARY.
I will not, in fact, be able to avoid a certain inquiry into historical progress. It is at 
this point I must refer to those guiding terms, those terms of reference which I use, 
namely, the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real (Lacan’s Ethics, p. 11).
We make our way now into an interpretation of the Lacanian tripartite ontology of the 
real, symbolic and imaginary, first by considering the nature of Plato’s idea of the Sov-
ereign good, the nature of the proto-Christian Platonism that Nietzsche in particular 
takes it to spawn, and then by considering some criticisms that Lacan and Nietzsche 
both make of it. Such criticisms I then aim to begin posing here in terms of all three 
parts of the said ontology: but also to inform it––in order then to properly orient our experi-
ence, and to theorise post-neurotically on what of life there is… 
The idea of the Good then Plato typically defines as being the supreme Capital of 
all the ideas; as the most real, true and lofty of them all. This Idea of ideas as idea of 
the Good, Plato would take as the eternal, absolute power, source and sanction of all 
the other ideas which can individually come to mind, descending down to us from a 
     9. An account of Kaufman’s installing Nietzsche as a canonical thinker in Nth America by reason of their 
combined propensities to bridge the ‘rift’ between analytic and continental streams of philosophy, can 
be found in Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, ‘“Dionysian Enlightenment”: Walter Kaufmann’s Nietzsche in 
Historical Perspective’, Modern Intellectual History, 3, 2 (2006), pp. 239-267.
     10. Lacan, The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, p. 305 (LE:305). Actually, Oedipus’s last words, in Sophocles’ play 
Oedipus at Colonus at least are, and not insignificantly perhaps, to actually bless the King and lands of Athens 
whilst asking to be remembered. A paper by Wiliam J. Richardson, ‘Lacan & the Enlightenment: Antigone’s 
Choice’, Research in Phenomenology, XXIV (1994), 25-41, on p. 34 points out that the phrase Lacan attributes 
to Oedipus is uttered by the chorus earlier in the play on line 1225.  
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realm of their own. A heavenly realm, which Plato likewise takes to be the source of all 
the physical things we encounter each day in our here down below; here in the earthly, 
nature-bound world of our everyday life.
But of these physical-material and earthly things, Plato takes them as fallen in some 
way from the Idea of the Good––fallen and inferior by virtue of their physical-materi-
ality no less, by virtue of the very predicates which make them our physical: ‘change’ 
and ‘bodilyness’ for instance. Plato holds our earthly things inferior by way of their 
purportedly greater distance from that purely psychical or spiritual realm he posits of 
the Sovereign Good; the Good he hints of in his The Phaedo for instance as “the power 
which makes things to be now disposed in the way that is best possible”––“the Good… 
which must unite and encompass everything else”11. But what’s more, it is to the heav-
enly of this Good above that upon death, what Plato takes to be our immortal soul may 
return if we had lived our lives in accordance with its unearthly laws: as if the paradise 
awaits but only for those, Plato wagers, “such as have purified themselves sufficiently by 
philosophy”, who could joyfully then be “freed from the regions of the earth as from a 
prison”*, and “live thereafter altogether without a body”12.
Plato articulates further this theory of ideas which places the Good up-top like the 
cap-stone of a pyramid in his The Republic. There he tells of a “reality, then, that gives 
their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower”––a 
reality which is none other for Plato than “the idea of Good”. This Good he implores 
we also conceive of “as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth insofar as known”; 
without forgetting any further that “the objects of knowledge not only receive from the 
presence of the Good their being known”, but also “their very existence and essence”. 
Though still Plato adds, last but not least, “the Good itself is not essence but still tran-
scends essence in dignity and surpassing power”13. 
After such the fecundity of formulation by his oft appropriated mouthpiece in Soc-
rates, Plato has the interlocutor Glaucon of course only “very ludicrously” answer, 
“Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go”14. But perhaps in accordance with Glau-
con’s initial expression of ‘ludicrosity’ here, Lacan and Nietzsche might instead hold that 
i) the Good is not really real or true, it’s imaginary, a mirage or fiction, only one that 
falsely claims to be ‘real’, in actual fact to be most ‘real’, when the opposite would rather 
     11. Plato, ‘The Phaedo’, 99b4-c5, in T. Chappell ed., The Plato Reader, Edinburgh University Press: 
Edinburgh, 1996.
     12. Plato, ‘The Phaedo’, 114b-c, in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns ed., The Collected Dialogues of  Plato: Including the 
Letters, trans. P Shorey, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999, p. 94. *Translation here is from one by 
G. M. A. Grube, following Burnet’s Oxford text, in S. M. Cahn ed., Classics of  Western Philosophy, Hackett 
Publishing: Indianapolis, 1979, p. 108, and I choose it because of the reference to the earth as a ‘prison’ 
which we may soon find of relevant interest, even though the Greek here does not contain the equivalent 
of this word specifically, but rather a participle for ‘freeing’ and one for ‘releasing’; the term ‘prison’ being 
rather implied.
     13. Plato, ‘The Republic’, 508e-509b, in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns ed., The Collected Dialogues of  Plato: 
Including the Letters, p. 744
     14. Plato, ‘The Republic’, 509c, in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns ed., The Collected Dialogues of  Plato: Including 
the Letters, p. 744. 
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be much closer to the truth; and ii) that this Good is also somewhat inimical in terms of 
valuation to all of that which is really real: i.e., to the material, earthly, somatic-sensual 
and instinctual real, especially the animal parts, the parts which make up much of our 
everyday life existence. 
Nietzsche’s admonition towards Plato is better known than Lacan’s, if for no other 
reason than that it’s more frequently pronounced and has been around for over half a 
century longer. But Lacan in his Ethics gives for instance the following indication of his 
own lack of sympathy towards the purported ‘truth’ and ‘highest’ valuation status of 
Plato’s Good: whence saying of Kingly Creon in the midst of an analysis of his actions 
as they appear in Sophocles’ play Antigone, that “His error of judgement… is to want to 
promote the good of all––and I don’t mean the Supreme Good, for let us not forget that 
441BC is very early, and our friend Plato hadn’t yet created the mirage of that Supreme 
Good”(LE:259)15. 
Clearly what can be predicated mirage here could hardly be likewise predicated as 
the ‘real’ and the ‘true’––not without the severe perversion of the latter two terms. But 
Creon here is also being shown by Lacan to give a proto-Platonic example of how it 
might be, as he says, that “the good cannot reign over all without an excess emerging 
whose fatal consequences are revealed to us in tragedy”(LE:259)––thus giving indication 
of Lacan’s view that not only is the Good not really real, but neither is it really ‘good’ 
either when we believe in it as such in terms of the effects it may have on us, excessive 
effects, and tragic whence believing too much the false to be ‘true’ and mirage to be 
‘real’, precisely a view Lacan shares with Nietzsche.
The structure of this Sovereign Good can well be surmised by the Nietzschean 
maxim: “the less real, the more valuable. This is Platonism”16––where we might con-
sider that one of the ways to successfully believe that what is ‘less real’ has ‘more value’, 
is to falsely believe it to be ‘most real’ as well. But this is precisely what can have the 
subsequent effect of reducing and devaluing all that really does exist as real to being, 
as Lacan says in the pejorative sense of Plato’s gambit: “no more than an imitation of a 
more-than-real, of a surreal”––“since for him everything that exists only exists in rela-
tion to the idea, which is the real”(LE:141). 
Hence with Nietzsche and Lacan now, the Idea of the Good we can instead take 
here as the un-real anti-real, which the Platonist misrecognises as ‘real’, whilst claiming its 
mirage too as the ‘truth’. But as Nietzsche is indicating with his maxim above, the less 
real more value move he considers not solely a feature of Plato’s thought, but also of 
what he calls ‘Platonism’––which for Nietzsche includes nearly all of the metaphysics to 
follow, but particularly the Christian forms, as indicated by his nigh summary execution 
at one point that: “Christianity is Platonism for the masses”17. 
For instead of being satisfied with merely an idea of the Sovereign Good, Nietzsche 
interprets that Christianity substitutes a more Judaeo-anthropomorphic version of it. A 
     15. Lacan, The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, p. 259 (my italics on ‘mirage’)
     16. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. & ed. W. Kaufmann, Vintage: NY, 1968, section572, p. 308.
     17. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Oxford Uni Press: NY, 1988, the preface.
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Sovereign God now––a God of  the Good!18 One who seats the throne warm of this same 
position, beyond the sky high like a Sinai, with a thunder cloud. A Yahweh who would 
one day cross with Paul the sunny shores of the Mediterranean, via Moses, and Egypt, 
and manage to take up some of the local garbs in a Grecian land already been made 
ready for “moral fanaticism”, as Nietzsche notes, by “Plato, the great viaduct of corrup-
tion, who first refused to see nature in morality”.19 For as hovering up above in an out-
of-this-world, after-world accessible only upon death, this new Godly realm was still de-
fined as with Plato to be most ‘real’, ‘true’, ‘moral’ and ‘good’ by and large, only insofar 
as it was not like the actual real-world here in nature upon the earth. An earthly world 
which is consequently rebaptised as ‘false’, Nietzsche writes, precisely on account of all 
the properties which actually make it real: i.e., “change, becoming, multiplicity, opposi-
tion, contradiction, war”20––not to mention the full gamut of bodily sensuality, together 
with all that dirt beneath the nail.
However, before probing deeper into the question of what might motivate this un-real, 
anti-real entity of the Good towards such the overvaluation as is falsely calling it the most 
‘real’, ‘good’ and ‘true’, but also in calling it the ‘source’ of all, the source of all ‘truth’, 
whilst posing it too as the afterlife destination for all who had submitted to its denatured 
Law––hyperboloid moves common to both Plato and Paul––I will firstly clarify further 
here what we who would be with Lacan and Nietzsche thus far might ourselves mean 
here by the real, and will do this along the way of both distinguishing and relating this 
real to the other two registers of the Lacanian tripartite ontology––the symbolic and the 
imaginary. 
This I take to be an important step, and a question of conscience, given that we 
may all be to some degree, as Alfred North Whitehead once implied, living amongst 
the “footnotes” of Plato’s grandiose metaphysical constructions21; and given too that as 
Nietzsche once wrote, that even though we are supposedly surpassed of certain imagi-
nary denouements: “we all still have bad instincts, the Christian instincts, somewhere 
within us”.22
The real thus in contradistinction to that of the Platonist we might define here as 
being nothing so other-worldly, nothing so invisible, nor something only accessible upon 
death by our purportedly un-somatic components. It’s just the earth in its material, sen-
sory-empirical actuality; the animals, plants and minerals of nature. It’s the bodies, their 
     18. Bataille also makes this ‘God of the Good’ connection in Eroticism, trans. M. Dalwood, London: 
Penguin, 2001(1957), p. 122-123.
     19. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section202, p. 118.
     20. From Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, section 584, but one should note that it is not the metaphysical 
or binary ‘opposite’, i.e., that which would require a facing-off between two perfectly fixed, diametrically 
separate, self-identical entities, that Nietzsche would ever ascribe to the change, becoming and multiplicity 
of the real; but rather, precisely that which opposes such metaphysical, simplifying and all too human 
constructions: by being something Other, something different! 
     21. A. N. Whitehead, Process & Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Cambridge Uni Press: Cambridge, 1929, Pt. 
II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.
     22. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, section59, in Twilight of  the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, 
Penguin: London-NY, 1990, p. 194.
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instincts and what they can do, what they can make out of other physical materials in 
the real––materials both organic and inorganic––through all of the inorganic materials 
far off into space, there where we are yet to discover anything else organic: yet to discover 
anything more of what we commonly refer to along with ourselves here as life.23 Out 
there in the greater universe together with all the force and energy that binds things, 
binds them together and pulls them apart, lights them up and sometimes explosively–
–all the way far into the hidden depths of the macro and micro aspects of the universe 
we are yet to even know about, and possibly never will we meagre mortals, who have 
done so well to even come this far: This is all the real.
To be sure, once we bring these particular entities or aspects of the real into relief 
here by putting them into such words as ‘plants’, ‘animals’, ‘molecules’, ‘atoms’, ‘force’ 
and ‘energy’, etc., then we are also having introduced here a symbolic dimension. For 
such words are of symbolic structures, of signifiers in links and chains differentiated 
from each other, and make up what Lacan would call the symbolic register: but only 
insofar as these symbolic signifiers, whether mathematical, linguistic or conceptual, etc., 
are used accurately enough according to standard and contemporary social practic-
es, standardised moral-legal customs, or for the more statistically common intents and 
purposes within the utilitarian space of working life. Such work amidst the symbolic, 
where means-ends calculation and causal inference rule the day, imply a more specifi-
cally determinate kind of rightly-labelled, right-minded sense-perception, and a progres-
sively more scientific, logical-empirical or conceptual-theoretical knowledge of a thing 
or process entity in the real: This is all the symbolic.24 
But there is thirdly introduced here an imaginary dimension, as mental images of 
plants, animals, bodies of people and the motions of outer-space, etc., may immedi-
ately be conjured for us and come to mind: via the recollected memory traces of per-
ceptual images we might have formed of these natural kinds via our sensory neuronal 
apparatuses––or via memory traces of ideational images we once might have formed to 
aid us through our previous symbolic propaedeutic. Sometimes the imaginary can also 
be evoked via the mirror; or via a courtship or a duel. All such images which can also 
then be further embellished in the imaginary: whereupon as Kant might say, the im-
aginary takes then the lead of the understanding, setting the two off into a “free-play”, 
or as Freud would say a “free-association”25, until these images corresponded to noth-
     23. Nietzsche writes: “Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being… We have some notion 
of the nature of the organic; and we should not reinterpret the exceedingly derivative, late, rare, accidental, 
that we perceive only on the crust of the earth and make of it something essential, universal, and eternal”. 
An awareness of that the earth is the only place of life we know of thus far might better help us to not 
denigrate its place in the real, whether intellectually or industrially. cf., The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufman, 
Vintage: NY, 1974, section109.
     24. Lacan also tells of the symbolic in his Ethics as that which is “grafted on to the real”(LE:20-21). We 
graft the symbolic onto the real in order to understand, differentiate, categorise, rank and regulate it for our 
various purposes.
     25. In his Interpretation of  Dreams (SE4:103) to illustrate the role of the imagination with respect to reason 
during processes of free-association, Freud writes of “what Schiller describes as a relaxation of the watch 
upon the gates of Reason”. This seems similar to the dialectic between “imagination” and “understanding” 
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ing directly real in the external world any longer, and might even encompass all sorts of 
gratuitous improvisations which are not, however, altogether without their own hidden 
significance.
And though we might adequately symbolise and form perceptual images of certain 
portions of the real, and with ever increasing degrees of accuracy as time progresses un-
hindered––as time mostly has since our Christian Dark Age has passed––in a substan-
tive sense, the real is still independent of us, it still exceeds us, exceeds our cognitions 
and interpretations of it. For we could never comprehend its infinite entirety with our 
finite mind and its finite organs, nor envisage it from all possible perspectives at once, 
thought to be endless: this would be as Lacan is often pointing out about the real––im-
possible26. And were we to here, as we might well suppose, one day completely die out as a 
species: then here the real would also out-exist us. It would still be here, here and there, 
albeit changed at the very least in the fraction through our absence––as indeed it was 
t/here before us, before there even was a planet earth let alone a species: a time before 
‘time’ where there was only just the real.
The real is thus what I define here as coming first and last. I ‘define’ it thus but it is 
also my argument––and a winnowing fan sorting wheat from chaff. For anything that 
would only instantly, completely be blown-away by the wind without our own brain’s 
cognitive presence here––cannot be real––but is rather only a product of our own subjec-
tive and projected outward imaginings. “What is real is also there outside”, Freud tells us, 
whereas “what is unreal, merely a presentation and subjective, is only internal”27. The 
prime examples of the latter ‘internals’ being an anthropomorphic God who created 
the universe, a heavenly-superior world which the ‘good’ amongst us can return to after 
death, and a Sovereign idea of a moral Good which is the ‘cause’ and ‘telos’ of all things 
considered.
But the real as argued-defined here to be both first and last, is also my interpreta-
tion of what Lacan means when he says in his Ethics that: “the real, I have told you, is 
that which is always in the same place”(LE:70). For if it is always in the same place, then 
this ‘always’ would mean that it was there before we were born as a species, and that it 
will still be there afterwards should we presumably die out. In short, regardless of whether 
there are humans around or not, and regardless of the multifarious ways that different 
humans might interpret certain aspects of it: the real itself flows on and on, it’s always 
Kant utilises in his third critique, where the aesthetic experience is characterised by these two faculties in 
“free-play”. cf., Kant, The Critique of  Aesthetic Judgement, §9. There is perhaps something worth considering 
here of Lacan’s “symbolic” and “imaginary” distinction as well.
     26. William Richardson touches on this ‘impossible’ aspect when he depicts “the real” as “the raw 
experience of what-is, the not yet symbolised or imaged, the ‘impossible’––i.e., impossible to inscribe in any 
symbolic system or represent in any form of image”. I think he is very right insofar as he means that the real 
is “impossible” to represent in its absolute entirety. cf., Richardson, ‘Psychoanalysis & the God Question’, 
from Thought Vol. 64 No. 240 (March 1986) 68-83, p. 73. Richardson is a professor of philosophy at Boston 
College who has published much on Lacan and Heidegger, both of whom are treated in the here cited 
paper, together with an attempt to retrieve the question of God in philosophy and psychoanalysis. I would 
however distance myself here from many parts of the latter attempt.
     27. Cf., Freud’s paper, ‘Negation’, in SE19:237, which Lacan makes several references to in his Ethics.
COSMOS AND HISTORY336
there and in the same place…28
Though while we are still around, the real is also ‘always’ there in that ‘place between 
our legs’––where indeed it can set itself upon us as what we’d rather to forget. Such is 
desire’s up-swelling of the parts of the real which make up our own bodies: the “private 
parts, the hairy ones, to be precise, the animal ones”29, as Bataille would write; just two 
years before Lacan would launch his own inquiry into this underside of Ethics. For such 
is desire as stemming of our inner-real which we’d rather to reject: like the being who 
“censures”, Lacan tells us, because “he doesn’t want it”(LE:14)––on the surface at least if 
not in the recessed heart. But this inner, bodily aspect of the real, presencing as desire 
and experienced subjectively from within, is the aspect most important for the psychoana-
lyst. For as pulsing beneath the foam and crest-tops of all our thoughts, dreams, reflec-
tions in the imaginary: and as ostensibly unbearable to acknowledge, bearing “the kind 
of discomfort”, Lacan adds, “that makes it so difficult for our neurotic patients to confess 
certain of their fantasms” (LE:80)––such portions are pushed then hurriedly aside. Out 
of ‘mind’ and out of ‘sight’ or such is the plan, to push desire deep into the un-conscious 
as if the source of all life’s woes and ills––where indeed it can be insofar as it seeps out 
unbeknownst to our selves, out in through the cracks and joinings of even our best sym-
bolic structures; at the interstitial peripheries of even our proudest, and too one-sided, 
symbolic rationalities.
However, such unwelcome showings of the inner-real are also important for the 
non-Platonic philosopher-psychologist like Nietzsche. For it is precisely here that we 
might then be tempted to ‘imagine’ and ‘symbolise’ the real, both without and within, 
only so as to hide and disguise it better. To slough it off; to conceal rather than to reveal 
it, whilst pretending instead to do the opposite: as if to promote ourselves by saying that 
we were ‘not’ neurotically inimical to the real of nature and the life it gives, but rather, 
leading in fact the ‘right’ kind of life, one in indubitable accordance with the moral law 
of the most Sovereign idea, or with the one true God, the God of the Good––raining 
     28. Further enquiry into this tripartite ontology may also be sought in Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary 
Institution of  Society, trans. K. Blamey, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1987(1975), pp. 115-160; an ontology he also 
explores in a later work published just before his death where he instead, “for heuristic purposes”, attempts 
to begin with the “imaginary” rather than with the “real”. However, insofar as this entails, as he says, 
“seeing in the physical world a deficient mode of being”, it could possibly leave one prey, perhaps, to the 
Platonism of valuing highest whatever is less real, and with a subsequently devalued conception of the real 
which is less than detailed, stabilised or accurate. cf., Castoriadis, World in Fragments, trans. D. A. Curtis, 
Stanford Uni Press: Stanford, 1997, p. 5. Yiannis Stavrakakis has recently written on some of the ontological 
commonality between Lacan and Castoriadis despite eventual differences. cf., Stavrakakis, The Lacanian 
Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory & Politics, Edinburgh Uni Press, 2007, pp. 41-45. Castoriadis was a member of the 
school Lacan founded in 1964 though by 1977, had broken away publishing some heavy criticisms of among 
other things, the Lacanian shortening of the analytic session; cf., his ‘Le Psychanalyse, projet et élucidation: 
Destin de l’analyse et responsabilité des analystes’, Topique 19 (April 1977): 73, 74. Perhaps a weaker  but no 
less revealing rebuke of the tendency with some Lacanians to offer an excessively “short-session”, which 
sometimes reportedly involves cramming “fifteen or even more analysands per hour” into “four-minute 
sessions”, can also be found in Bruce Fink, Fundamentals of  Psychoanalytic Technique: a Lacanian approach for 
Practitioners, Norton: NY, 2007, p. 60. 
     29. Bataille, Eroticism, p. 143.
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divine will from superior ‘aboves’ which are really only of our own construction. Such con-
structions, however, we can’t always admit to being the author of, because they’re pre-
cisely those in the imaginary we’ve used to patch-over the truth of what is really real––the 
real which is nothing so concerned for our apparent likes and dislikes, our pleasures and 
pains, and nothing so wholly rational, moral, divine and good as we might on the sur-
face have thought to have wished for.
Here with such ‘cosmic’, cosmological constructions: “‘the true world’ is supposed to 
be the good world––why?”30 asks Nietzsche; noting how oftenest is the case that “to im-
agine another more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that actually 
makes one suffer”––i.e., a hatred for this world, the real, earthly one––and hence the nihilism-
despair when the fictions dissolve, as merely the underlying “ressentiment of metaphysi-
cians against actuality is here creative” 31. But perhaps there is some-thing residually real 
even Nietzsche misses?––when we consider what Lacan in his Ethics will call das Ding, 
the somewhat diabolical Freudian Thing! It’s our somewhat extra perverse little portion 
of the real; and a concept to be examined in the section that follows.
2. INTRODUCING THE THING: AN ETHICS THAT WANTS TO GO FUR-
THER INTO THE REAL.
Well, as odd as it may seem to that superficial opinion which assumes any inquiry 
into ethics must concern the field of the ideal, if not of the unreal, I, on the contrary, 
will proceed instead from the other direction by going more deeply into the notion 
of the real. …To appreciate this, one has to look at what occurred in the interval 
between Aristotle and Freud (Lacan’s Ethics, p. 11).
In the previous section, having laid out an interpretation of Lacan’s tripartite ontology, 
and having done so in order to begin the examination of the Platonic structure in terms 
of its three––I have also begun intimating that it’s usually the aspects of the real most 
commonly referred to and experienced as ‘nature’ without and within, that are aimed at 
antipathetically by the Platonic move. I wish now to examine further the reasons for this 
by way of Lacan’s Ethics seminar concept of the Thing, but also by way of this seminar’s 
deployment of the great product of Plato’s Academy––the thought of Aristotle––whose 
Nicomachean Ethics Lacan invites us to ponder as the exemplary point of both reference 
and departure…
It’s important when making reference to nature, to what is real of what we experi-
ence and signify as ‘nature’, that we don’t let form in us a conception that is too idyllic. 
To be sure, nature is capable of such moments, but that’s not all. As Bataille would say: 
“nature herself is violent”32––and he’s very right insofar as he means that nature is vio-
lent as well as it is in part idyllic; and that it’s these violent parts that particularly concern 
     30. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section578. Lacan in Seminar17 says similarly: “One fails to see why truth 
would always necessarily be beneficial. You would have to have the devil in you to imagine such a thing…” 
cf., The Other Side of  Psychoanalysis(1969-70), trans. R. Grigg, Norton: NY, 2007, p. 106.
     31. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 579.
     32. Bataille, Eroticism, p. 40.
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when it comes to morality, along with by and large nigh all that is sexual.
Lacan in his Ethics asks us to look at Aristotle’s notion of nature, in order that we 
may, as he says: “consider how far that notion of nature is different from ours”(LE:13). 
Since to Lacan’s way of thinking, Aristotle’s notion is one to support an ethics which 
believes it can legitimately exclude the perverse elements from the field of morality, a 
dreadful weight as shed along the primrose path of a ‘natural’ development, and a life of 
happiness and fulfilment. Yet these excluded elements constitute a class of desires which 
we might well with Lacan now consider right “in the forefront of our experience”(LE:5); 
particularly with the questions of ethics since raised by the findings of psychoanalysis, 
whence put into relation with the contemporary destruction of life in our earthly envi-
ronment. Here Lacan might further add that “the pile of garbage is one of the sides of 
the human dimension that it would be wrong to mistake”(LE:233).33
However, somewhere back in the fourth century BC, Aristotle has a theory of the 
macrocosm which he believes supports him. It’s no doubt “a tidied-up, ideal order”(LE:315) 
for him Lacan tells us, a universe that’s logical and rational. Its origin, first-cause and 
end-point are, as with Plato, a kind of perfect notion of the Good: thus it’s natural that 
Aristotle thinks we might ‘naturally’ steer away from the bestial abjects of desire. Lacan 
speaks of how for Aristotle, a particular ethics must be inserted into the better part of 
the macrocosm: “brought together in a Sovereign Good”––so that a “this” ethics be-
comes “the” ethics, “and beyond that, with an imitation of the cosmic order.”(LE:22) To 
borrow the language of Kant, as Lacan indeed at one point does, it’s as if Aristotle thinks 
that the “starry heavens above” would ‘naturally’ lure the “moral law within”(LE:316) us 
towards the moral Good he purports to be the incorruptible guiding-source of the entire 
universe. Aristotle even begins his ethical treatise with what he calls the “well said” 
claim that “the Good is That at which all things aim”34––unless of course, as he quali-
fies later, one were of “disease”, “sexual perversion”, or had perhaps been “abused from 
childhood”, causing bad “habit” which had “arrested development”35.
But unlike the psychoanalyst––though perhaps in some accordance with the depic-
tion of the noble or aristocratic master-morality once depicted by Nietzsche––Aristotle 
     33. Ray Anderson, CEO of the world’s largest carpet manufacturer, makes the following striking claim: 
“There is not a single, scientific, peer reviewed paper published in the last 25 years that would contradict 
this scenario: that every living system of earth is in decline”, from The Corporation, a documentary film by 
the Canadian professor of Law Joel Bakan, and based on his book The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of  
Profit and Power, Constable: London, 2004.
     34. Jonathan Lear, an analyst and philosopher at Chicago, sees the impersonal-passivity of this claim, the 
“it has been well said”, as a possible symptom of Aristotle’s wish to cover-over part the origins of this Good: 
contained perhaps in the ghost of Plato’s murdered Father function in Socrates. cf., Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book I. i.1, Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold, trans. H. Rackham, Harvard Uni Press: 
Cambridge-London, 1999, p. 3; and J. Lear, Happiness, Death & the Remainder of  Life, Harvard Uni Press: 
Cambridge-London, 2000, pp. 7-8, 10-11, 101-4. Lacan himself returns to examine this opening passage in 
his later Seminar XX, On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of  Love & Knowledge, 1972-3, trans. B. Fink, Norton: 
NY-London, 1999, p. 52.
     35. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. v. 4, p. 403 & v. 2, p. 401.
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seeks to keep such the “pathos of distance”36 between us and the perverse bestial that at 
one point, he even seems to consider animals themselves as unnatural––given that they 
are not rational, and hence can be considered as “aberrations” from the good, clean, 
ordered essence of “nature” and the universe as defined by him!37 Nietzsche would of 
course at this point tell the great Aristotle that he was on his own, and much too much 
like his old teacher Plato, promoting ‘fictions’ which were if not ‘ignoble’ in intent, than 
at least so perhaps in their lasting consequence…
For Lacan, however, analysis turns ethics on its ‘back-side’ by revealing a far smaller 
distance between us and the perverse class of desires Aristotle wants to exclude. But this 
might only mirror the fact that by the time of Nietzsche––heading beyond what Lacan 
refers to with respect to ethics as “the moment when the disorienting effects of Newto-
nian physics is felt”(LE:76)––advancements in the methods of science were in piecemeal 
fashion, further revealing the real of what we commonly symbolise and imagine as the 
‘universe’ to be far less clock-work and virtuous by design than scores of generations had 
previously hoped. Soon there was nothing so supra-celestially good and rational any-
more, to guarantee or enforce our preferred type of moral ‘life’.
Nietzsche is consistently able to roll the meta-ethical implications of such scientific 
advancements together into a series of paragraphs that leave the reader bracing and in 
no doubt as to where precisely we are at at present––aptly surmised by his de-teleologi-
cising phrase when considering the universe overall that: “becoming aims at nothing and 
achieves nothing”.38 That said, Nietzsche also continues to speak of a return to nature 
that, like it or not, is a far more “frightful nature and naturalness”39 than such moves 
previously had imagined––and that great tasks were no longer possible without the uti-
lising mindfulness of these more terrifying aspects as well.
Like Freud, when it comes to the more unsavoury aspects of what is real in what we 
conceptualise as ‘nature’, Nietzsche would encourage a kind of responsively rigorous, 
gaya scienza rationality, and a genuinely grand-style, artistic-creative sublimation, rather 
than say repression, falsification and phobic denial. Though Freud is perhaps essentially 
correct to claim––and this might qualify his earlier cited comments about being willing 
“to forgo all claims to priority in the many instances”40 where Nietzsche was his anteced-
ent––that Nietzsche had “failed to recognise infantilism”;41 that is, had failed to fully 
     36. Cf., Nietzsche’s, On the Genealogy of  Morals, First Essay, Section2; and also Nietzsche’s, Beyond Good and 
Evil, section257.
     37. To some bemusement from the translator who almost seems to doubt himself over this, Aristotle 
writes, “for animals have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from nature, 
like men who are insane.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Goold, Book VII. vi. 6, p. 411.
     38. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section12. Another extended example of Nietzsche’s de-anthropomorphising 
of the real of what we more commonly symbolise and imagine as the ‘universe’ or ‘nature’––which Kaufman 
considers as the following-up of the consequences of the death of God––can be found in section 109 of The 
Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufman, Vintage: NY, 1974, where Nietzsche writes, “None of our aesthetic and 
moral judgments apply to it”; at least not the most Platonic ones!
     39. Nietzsche, Twilight of  the Idols, section48.
     40. Freud, SE14:16 (my italics).
     41. Cf., Paul-Laurent Assoun, Freud and Nietzsche, p. 8.
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elaborate upon the polymorphous, perverse sexuality born in every infant child. Thus 
in this sense perhaps, Nietzsche’s ethics, though completely devoid of the manicuring 
accounts of the universe that dominate Platonism––centred around belief in a ‘more-
than-real’ Sovereign good––is still a bit like Aristotle’s ethics in that it at least aims for a 
greater pathos of distance between us and the abject aspects of our inner real, than the 
findings of psychoanalysis would then render so admissible.
This abject core is what Lacan in his Ethics will call das Ding––that Thing of our 
bodies as experienced from within: perhaps corresponding in some ways to what 
modern neuroscience refers to as the older “reptilian” (brain-stem) and “paleo-mam-
malian” (limbic) parts of the brain––sending still their signals to our higher-order pe-
ripheries42; sending as what Lacan and Freud call the “archaic” “nucleus” at the instinc-
tual “source of the Triebe (drives)” (LE:93). Such drives are said by Lacan to ideationally 
represent these archaic, somatic instincts stemming from the Thing, if and when they 
eventually do come to mind, for they do so by way of language and image in addition 
to being felt, by way of what Lacan would simply refer to as the signifier. Yet at the centre 
of these signifiers is no Sovereign good(LE: 70, 300), but this Thing like core which in-
cludes nearly all the pre-genital functions and fixations surrounding the infantile organs 
of sensing, eating, excreta and pleasure. The sexual pleasures too––“from the oral to 
the anal”(LE:92) as Lacan lets quip––and then some we fear with aggression in the mix. 
But through then to the genital phase we go then presumably: through to the promised 
lands of reciprocal love.
Yet of this latter genital phase, the purported crown of our libidinal development, it 
is not always so stable an equilibrium Lacan tells us, but rather one which is later forged 
or formed to synthesise our still component pre-genital instincts, our ever present and 
lingering antecedents. But this later forging must only then to face the prohibitions on 
incest43 and thence the rules of consent, the rules of attraction, as well as all the more 
general considerations of propriety concerning time, place, the who the why and all the 
rest, transpiring in a world already brimming with neurosis: full of the many frustra-
tions and loss which suggest that the path to genital oblativity is not nearly as smooth 
     42. The neuroscientist Paul MacLean explores something of this thesis in his The Triune Brain in Evolution: 
Role in Paleocerebral Functions, Springer, 1990. See also a paper by Fred Levin, ‘Neuroscience: The Amygdala, 
Hippocampus, and Psychoanalysis’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 66:555-560, 1997, where the amygdala and 
hippocampus, as located in the limbic system, seem to be connected with memory and emotion: the 
amygdala especially associated with rapid response fear. Back in 1959, Lacan himself spends the first 
division of his Ethics focussing on Freud’s posthumously released in 1950 Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(1895), SE1:283-399; a project Freud initially undertook yet soon abandoned to make psychology into a 
quantitative-material ‘natural’ science, just four years after Waldeyer’s 1891 discovery of the ‘neurone’. 
Lacan for his part is sceptical of the “assumption” that the “nervous system” can adequately account for 
the concrete psychoanalytic experience: claiming that no one yet had bettered Freud’s then superlative yet 
still at times “fanciful” attempt(LE:30). However, it would likely be but a Platonic prejudice for us now to 
discourage dialogue with more recent neurological findings, as if our wondrous higher-order ‘forms’ and 
functions wouldn’t dare to traffic with the gore, blood and rippled, chemical-electric real that the brain 
presents!
     43. Lacan remarks that Freud stood first to identify “incest as the fundamental desire”(LE:67). 
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as we might’ve wished. Such promising moves of oblativity in the hands of the analyst 
Lacan even goes so far as to declare a “moralising hustle or a bluff, whose dangers can’t 
be exaggerated”(LE:312); insofar as they again seek to cover over the true nature of the 
Thing, leaving its effects too beyond of our assailable jurisdiction.
Freud at one point defines these disallowed impulses of the Thing as “egoistic, sadis-
tic, perverse or incestual”44; whilst elsewhere he also refers to them as our “individual” 
sense of the “prehistoric”45: a second sense he takes himself to have discovered in each 
of our childhoods, to go with the one Darwin discovers for our species way back in the 
Palaeolithic. Following Freud, this Thing of our species and individual births is what 
Lacan depicts in his Ethics as “the pre-historic Other that is impossible to forget”(LE:71). 
Though forget it we try, for when it surges, it can be fundamentally transgressive and ad-
dictively so, towards the norms and forms operating within our selves and societies. 
Hence it is split-off during the course of our socialisation, made object of that great wave 
of primal repression said by Freud to usher in the latency phase for the child around the 
age of five, as the Oedipal material cleaves into the incest taboo, meaning that the most 
sexual aspects of being can only re-emerge later in puberty, but only by continuing to 
“magic circle”(LE:134) around that Thing below, which is still much forbidden, and often 
the real of our desire.
Darwin could eventually be forgiven his Thing; by science at least if not by Chris-
tendom. But less so for Freud it seems still today, as the Thing he uncovers ‘lies’ closer 
to home. Certain aspects of this Thing would still only cause too much pain to consider; 
let alone experience. And for Freud, this very much explains the perpetual resistances to-
wards the truths of psychoanalysis: as well as the perennial temptations of subsequent 
scholars to ‘refute’ its claims nigh by any means at the intellect’s disposal46. But more 
specifically for Lacan, this Thing also explains the role of the pleasure-principle: a prin-
ciple whose aim is not as we might at first think simply to satisfy as many of our instinc-
tual-drives as directly as possible; but rather, to keep our tension to a minimum level, 
by keeping us constant from a painful self-admission of our Thing. To “maintain the 
distance”(LE:58) as Lacan puts it, as we seek instead our pleasures cast a drift, from sig-
nifier to signifier, which never lead us directly to the Thing, even though unconsciously 
at least, one searches if not for it, than at least because of it. But as Lacan says, “one 
never finds it, only its pleasurable associations”(LE:52)––through objects which can sig-
nify some associative connection, but which are still chosen, more or less, because in ac-
cordance with the prevailing etiquettes of a ‘reality-principle’ which tells us that certain 
things we want will not give us pleasure, because they might risk us punishment, as still 
most forbidden.
However, it is here we can ourselves re-find again the temptation then to interpret 
‘reality’ in accordance with our pleasure principle; i.e., to deselect the parts we do not 
     44. Freud, SE19:132.
     45. See for instance Freud’s 1924-5 paper on ‘The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis’, in SE19:220. 
     46. A not wholly uninteresting recent example can be found with Todd Dufresne, Against Freud: Critics Talk 
Back, Stanford Uni Press: Stanford, 2007. Todd has dedicated this book to his father Raymond. 
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‘like’. And truth is many times the casualty here, the truth of what is actual and real, as 
Nietzsche argues of the whole phenomena of Platonism, Freud of the resistances to psy-
choanalysis, and both of the inability of too many still to relinquish the opiate phantasies 
of religion. Our pleasure and reality principles might collude thus together, so that what 
we define as ‘reality’ is not necessarily our best approximation at the truth, but also a 
means to veil over it, especially the Thing like aspects within. But painful fearing of this 
Thing within leads us to cover over some of the real’s external aspects as well, insofar 
as this external covering might feign give us comfort, and help us to achieve this inner 
denial. For example, as belief in the Devil might help us disavow such sexual instincts 
and have them come from some place else; or like belief in an external Heaven and Hell 
could help motivate us in this inner sex-negating task––or like belief in a clock-work, 
incorruptibly end-directed universe, guided by and heading towards a Sovereign good, 
might help us believe that we can and should be a little more clock-work and incorrupt-
ibly end-directed ourselves.
“Well then”, as Lacan likes to say, what we have here in the end is rather “the notion 
of a deep subjectivisation of the outside world”: one stemming from a fundamental com-
portment within us that “sifts” and “sieves” reality in such a way that it is often only per-
ceived by us “as radically selected”. A human hence only ever “deals with select bits of 
reality”, Lacan concludes, when admission of any Other would yield the loss of pleasure 
47. But that the pleasure and ‘reality’ principles thus can work together in this subterfuge 
way, i.e., that they don’t simply oppose each other, that “each one is really the correla-
tive of the other”(LE:74), is one of the key points that Lacan in his Ethics seeks to make; 
though not without making the additional qualification that this concerns “not so much 
the sphere of psychology as that of ethics”(LE:35).
For to circle in too close to the Thing which is ethically forbidden by our reality 
principles––yet too the real truth of much desire––does hardly give us pleasure at all 
but anguish of the heaviest kind. Even if done so only as a thought experiment; as a 
free-association. So go there we generally don’t, and our ‘realities’ reflect as much. But 
henceforth when desire builds up, damns and flares return of the Thing: this is how 
Lacan specifically characterises the move we might make that goes beyond the pleas-
ure principle, whose other name for Freud is ‘death-drive’. There where there is no, 
not pleasure yet jouissance in the transgression that the Thing would bring, a jouissance 
of transgression which Lacan suggests is the most direct satisfaction of a drive humanly 
possible48. But it’s also one perhaps unconsciously masochistic, that which Freud writes 
up as being only preliminarily sadistic, in eventually expressing itself as an “unconscious 
need for punishment”49. And if indeed we are feeling guilty, then we may yet still seek 
     47. Cf., LE: 47. On p. 225 he even adds that, “In truth, we make reality out of pleasure.”
     48. Cf., LE: 200, 209, & 322 where he says, “Sublimate as much as you like; you still have to pay for it 
with something. And this something is called jouissance.” Jouissance is the satisfaction of a drive beyond the 
pleasure-reality principle; hence the role of transgression or law-breaking within it.
     49. Cf., Freud, Civilisation & Its Discontents (1929), Ch VIII, and also in The Economic Problem of  Masochism(1924), 
SE19:166. Lacan’s Ethics makes several references to the structures there, particularly on p. 15, stating that 
we’d “have really arrived at the heart of the problem of existing perversions, if we managed to deepen our 
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to pay the price. Why? For unknowingly possessing and inadvertently re-accessing this 
Thing in our real, beyond the pleasure-reality principle, our moral transgressions cast-
ing shadow long into the unconscious we know next to nothing about, and refuse even 
to acknowledge. 
Could it not be thusly then that our time is behind now a sadomasochistic, wilfully 
ignorant drive towards death for nigh the entire species? Such punishment would too 
overly suffice, to be sure, for even a two-millennium length in repression…
But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correla-
tive advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the 
great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increas-
ingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre sce-
nario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no 
less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin50. 
For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s 
Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the 
Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sov-
ereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.
CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.
This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply 
into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given 
that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platon-
ic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which 
upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.
Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special 
but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physi-
cal treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, 
and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the 
problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its de-
scendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves 
on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos–
–which only then lines itself up aside of an age-old repression, a repression of das Ding, 
that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and 
denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.
Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civili-
sation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, 
snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western moral-
understanding of the economic role of masochism.”
     50. Professor Noam Chomsky for instance states then sources to great detail that the very real terminal 
threats to our survival include, “Nuclear war, environmental disaster, and the fact that the government of 
the world’s leading superpower is acting in ways that increase the likelihood.” cf., Failed States: the Abuse of  
Power and the Assault on Democracy, Allen-Unwin: NSW, 2006, p. 1.
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ity 51; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threat-
ened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry 
here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the 
Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper 
understanding of  the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in 
accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, 
and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our 
most tragic problems.
The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild–
–which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why 
and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a 
Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing 
down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever ready-
ing the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what 
Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disap-
pear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary 
overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can 
even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think 
then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, 
in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether52. Following such 
negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made 
up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what 
is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl 
of the inorganic; as per that “second death”53 fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre 
de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the 
principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, 
organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is 
only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic-neurotics are but hide inside––a 
cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, dis-
torted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective 
psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying 
within…
But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both 
     51. See in particular LE:231-235, where by no means can one easily overstate the level of deep foreboding 
Lacan contains towards our prospects of a decent survival; probably outmatched today only by the more 
empirically detailed and sustained political evaluations of Professor Chomsky. The phrase “race towards 
destruction” comes from a similar moment of foreboding in Lacan’s first seminar, some six years prior to 
the Ethics, where he links the problem of annihilation and “hatred” directly into the mechanisms of Western 
morality; thus indicating in lieu of the later Ethics seminar, a long growing intellectual concern for him here. 
Cf., Lacan,  Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, The Seminar of  Jacques Lacan Book I, ed. J-A Miller, trans. J. 
Forrester, Norton: London-NY, 1991, p. 277. 
     52. Cf., Plato, The Phaedo, 114b, trans. G. Grube, in S. M. Cahn ed., Classics of  Western Philosophy, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1979, p. 108.
     53. Cf., LE: 232, 260, 294-5. 
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without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guar-
anteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the 
further disclosures of The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of 
the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual 
übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake-head than he could chew? From cer-
tain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this 
Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, 
though not without some perhaps hinted at self-amusement.54
But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all 
positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper dis-
closure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the 
nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth 
living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense 
of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ 
claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and 
creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on 
display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq 
as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also 
resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of 
a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory 
defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and 
leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good 
does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to 
take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic 
dysfunction . Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-
ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow 
Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and 
threw the rest into abyss. 
The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no 
means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, 
decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard 
all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-Ameri-
can for instance!55 For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, 
Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: 
including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good 
is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not 
     54. Cf., for instance Nietzsche, The Gay Science, preface for the 2nd edition (1886), section4, where he 
writes, “No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to ‘truth at any price’, this youthful madness in the love of truth, 
have lost their charm for us … Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything 
naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and ‘know’ everything.”
     55. Cf., Chomsky, ‘Simple Truths, Hard Problems’, Philosophy 80, 2005, © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 
pp. 14-17; and ‘Moral Truisms, Empirical Evidence & Foreign Policy’, Review of  International Studies (2003), 
29, 605-620, © British International Studies Association,  pp. 607-615.
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that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a 
cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’
By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome 
Freudian Thing that The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: 
we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism 
of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as 
culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy 
by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing 
like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, 
it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to 
train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we 
can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a 
positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life ––including that Freudian Ding in 
our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no 
longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to 
the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real 
Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition 
until it accidentally finishes us!
“That is why when we ask what is beyond the barrier erected by the structure of 
the world of the good––when we ask where is the point on which this world of 
the good turns––as we wait for it to drag us to our destruction, our question has a 
meaning that you would do well to remember has a terrifying relevance.” Lacan’s 
Ethics, May 1960.
